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Abstract
The process of individual identity formation is still an enigma, as is the capacity of
public bodies to intervene in it. In 1983, the Catalan education system became bilingual,
and Catalan, along with Spanish, was taught in schools. Using survey data from Catalonia
we show that respondents who have been exposed for a longer time period to teaching
in Catalan have stronger Catalan feelings. The e¤ect also appears to be present among
individuals whose parents do not have Catalan origins; in addition the reform a¤ects political
preferences and attitudes towards the organization of the State.
1 Introduction
Of all political questions, that [of education] is perhaps the most important.
There cannot be a rmly established political state unless there is a teaching body
with denitely recognized principles. If the child is not taught from infancy that
he ought to be a republican or a monarchist, a Catholic or a free-thinker, the state
will not constitute a nation; it will rest on uncertain and shifting foundations; and
it will be constantly exposed to disorder and change. [Napoleon]1
Education has often been invoked as an important instrument of nation building and State
power consolidation. History provides some examples: in his lectures delivered in Berlin (Ad-
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1Quoted in Reisner (1922), p35.
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dresses to the German nation, 1807), Fichte explicitly emphasized the importance of state-
controlled mass education in teaching Germans to be good Germans and to create the unied
national sentiment needed to restore Prussian power. Between 1817 and 1825, new taxes were
imposed to revitalize the Prussian school system and, as a result, every Prussian land was re-
quired to have primary schools.2 Similarly, in 1833, the French Minister of Public Instruction,
Francois Guizot, introduced a law that obliged every commune or group of neighboring com-
munes to set up and maintain at least one elementary school. As argued by Weber (1976),
the school, and in particular the village school, spreading the knowledge and the use of the
French language, was a determinant factor in the acculturation process that made the French
people French. In the second half of the 19th century, primary education was at the center of
political debate in Italy as well. In 1859, the Italian schooling system was completely reorga-
nized and strengthened in order to break the monopoly of the Catholic Church and to build the
foundations of a modern liberal State. Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) also discussed how
indoctrination in public schools might explain the e¤ect of Communism on the preferences of
Eastern Germans towards state intervention.
Nation-building policies (such as the implementation of a sole national language in schools
and across the entire territory of a State) as well as multicultural policies that explicitly recog-
nize cultural di¤erences (regional autonomy, the devolution of powers, or the use of multiple
languages in schools and in other contexts) have been often proposed as sources of conict
management in ethnically divided societies. Several social scientists (Anderson, 1983; Bates,
1983; and Horowitz, 1985) have argued that the boundaries of ethnic groups and the strength
of ethnic ties are not exogenous and change over time. They are likely to be a¤ected by social
and economic conditions and to depend on a number of economic and policy choices. To date,
however, only limited research has been carried out to examine the extent to which ethnic iden-
tication can be shifted by cultural policies and regulation. We know surprisingly little about
2Ramirez and Boli (1987) study the political origins of mass schooling extensively.
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whether government policies in general, and educational systems in particular, can enhance
national cohesion and revitalize the national sentiment of a country.
Our paper takes a step in this direction by analyzing the e¤ect on the process of identity
formation of a particular educational policy implemented in the Spanish region of Catalonia.
Up to 1983, Spanish was the o¢ cial language of the Catalan education system. That year the
education system became bilingual, and both Catalan and Spanish were used as languages of
instruction.
Using survey data from Catalonia and exploiting variation in the number of years of com-
pulsory education under Catalan instruction, results show that individuals who experienced
greater exposure to teaching in Catalan are more likely to say that they feel more Catalan than
Spanish. As is the case for most of the reforms involving changes in the languages of instruction,
the introduction of bilingualism in Catalan schools was associated with other adjustments in the
educational system, such as changes in textbooks and course contents. Although the existing
data do not allow us to disentangle the language e¤ect from the e¤ect of these additional fea-
tures, which are extensively discussed in the paper, with our identication strategy we deliver
a global evaluation of the 1983 reform which is broadly comparable to similar linguistic reforms
implemented in other educational systems across the world.
Our identication strategy relies on variation between cohorts in exposure to the Catalan
language at school. The larger the number of years of schooling the individual has received in
Catalan, the more a¤ected he or she will be, but given that the number of years of schooling is
typically an individual choice that could also be related to identity, we consider the number of
years of compulsory education under Catalan teaching as the main measure of exposure to the
reform. This number of years is not an individual choice and varies across cohorts. We then
include polynomial functions of the year of birth in the regressions to account for cohort or age
e¤ects. A number of factors lead us to believe that the link between the educational reform and
individual identity is causal. Several robustness checks allow us to conclude that the results are
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neither driven by cohort specic trends on Catalan identity nor by the impact on identity of an
other important event such as the end of the Franco dictatorship. We also do not nd evidence
that the reform a¤ected migration ows or changed the composition of the Catalan population.
In the second part of the paper we present a set of additional results and discuss extensively
how a change in the language of instruction can have important economic implications.
First, we show how the educational reform has had an e¤ect on political preferences. In eth-
nically divided societies language at school can a¤ect economic outcomes by changing political
preferences, therefore inuencing the selection of politicians and the policies they implement.
Since in ethnically divided societies individual identity is likely to a¤ect the political choices of
individuals, the reform could have increased the vote share of ethnic parties. Indeed, we nd
that individuals who have experienced greater exposure to teaching in Catalan are more likely
to declare that they chose a party with a Catalanist (i.e., Catalan regionalist) platform. Results
suggest that the reform increased the salience of the ethnic issue in the Catalan society and
helped consolidate a political system organized along ethnic lines. Moreover, changes in the
language of education could also have an impact on preferences regarding the organization of
the State, which could inuence the probability of having an open conict. As a further step,
we then study the e¤ect of the 1983 reform on separatist attitudes and we nd that respondents
a¤ected by the reform are more likely to claim that Spanish regions should have the right to be
independent States.
Second, we discuss how the introduction of compulsory bilingual educational system could
a¤ect the degree of integration of minorities within a country, which it is likely to be related to
their economic outcomes. The 1983 reform can be interpreted as an example of nation-building
policy within Catalonia, where individuals living in Catalonia but who were born elsewhere or
whose parents do not have Catalan origins are the relevant minority. We nd that the e¤ect
of the reform on individual identity also appears to be present among respondents educated in
Catalonia after the reform but whose parents do not have Catalan origins. Therefore, if both
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family and school can a¤ect identity, this result suggests that nation-building policies indeed
tend to promote a common national feeling and that education, through language, can partially
balance the role of family in the cultural transmission process.
This paper is connected to an emerging literature within economics that explicitly focuses
on the identity formation process. In an inuential series of papers, Akerlof and Kranton
(2000, 2002, 2005) and Akerlof (2007) incorporate identity, a persons sense of self, into an
economic model of behavior. They then present several applications of their theory in the
elds of the Economics of Education, the Economics of Organizations and Macroeconomics.
Several theoretical studies followed the work by Akerlof and Kranton, including research by
Benabou and Tirole (2011) and Bisin et al. (2006). Eckel and Grossman (2005), Charness et
al. (2006), Mc Leish and Oxoby (2007), Heap and Zizzo (2009) and Chen and Li (2009) provide
laboratory experiments that show how group identity a¤ects individual behavior. Ethnic and
national identity, by inuencing the support for local and national governments, may also have
important repercussions on the level of tax evasion and on whether individuals decide to buy
public debt issued by governments. Indeed, Li (2011) provides evidence that strong levels of
national identity stimulate tax morale.
However, the number of empirical studies which study the determinants of individual identity
and in particular how educational policies a¤ect identity remains limited. In Aspachs et al.
(2008) we cite results presented in this paper, compare individuals in Catalonia and in the
Basque Country to focus on the interaction between family and schooling in shaping identity
and suggest that students are sorted into Basque or Spanish classes according to the identity of
their parents. That summary piece is the rst to discuss the correlation between exposure to
language of instruction and identity; however it does not take into account that the number of
years of education is typically an individual (or parental) choice, so it does not provide estimates
of the causal e¤ect. This paper is the rst to provide evidence on the casual impact of Catalan
instruction on individual identity by exploiting variation between cohorts in the number of
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years of compulsory education received in Catalan language. Moreover, it also contributes to
the literature by considering and discussing the economic implications of the observed shift in
national attachment.
The paper is also related to the literature on the mechanisms of cultural transmission and the
e¤ects of culture on economic outcomes. Culture and trust explain di¤erences in nancial habits
(Guiso et al., 2004), in living arrangements in Western Europe (Giuliano, 2007) and also in GDP
per capita across European regions (Tabellini, 2007). If we then consider identity as part of
our cultural background, our paper shows that education a¤ects individual cultural attributes.3
This result seems to be related as well with part of the literature on endogenous preferences.
Bowles (1998) extensively discusses how political and economic institutions shape preferences
through their e¤ects on social norms, cultural transmission or through other channels. If identity
is part of the utility function, our paper isolates a particular institutional arrangement (bilingual
education) that is able to inuence individual preferences.
Finally, this work is linked to a panoply of papers that study the relationship between ethnic
diversity and economic and political outcomes. Easterly and Levine (1997) claim that high levels
of ethnic fragmentation were at the root of Africas growth tragedy. La Porta et al. (1999) show
that ethnic heterogeneity is negatively correlated with the quality of government and, more
recently, Montalvo and Reynal (2005) and (2006) explore the channels through which ethnic
diversity inuences economic development. They nd that ethnic fractionalization lowers the
rate of investment, while ethnic polarization increases the probability of civil wars. In contrast
to those papers, our study tries to understand the roots of individual ethnic identication.4
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the reform and more generally
the institutional setting in Catalonia. Then the data and the empirical strategy employed are
discussed. Section 3 reports the main results and Section 4 provides several robustness checks.
3Aghion et al. (2010a) and (2010b) investigate how government regulation interferes with culture, social
capital and norms of cooperation.
4Miguel and Posner (2005) and Masella (2011) study the relationship between ethnic diversity and ethnic and
national identity.
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Section 5 discusses the possible economic implications of educational changes that are able to
shift identities and national attachment. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Empirical Strategy
2.1 Background
Catalonia is a region in northeast Spain. Catalan is a language that evolved from vulgar Latin
in the 9th century on both sides of the eastern part of the Pyrenees. Its territorial expansion
went hand in hand with the expansion of the Catalano-Aragonese Crown, which was established
in other Spanish regions such as Valencia and the Balearic Islands, the south of France and the
town of Alghero (in Sardinia, Italy). These are the regions where Catalan is nowadays present
with more than 9 million speakers, making it one of the most important regional languages in
the European Union. Catalonia is the region that hosts most of them, with more than 6 million
speakers.
Catalan has not always been the main language in schools in Catalonia. From the middle
of the twentieth century, when education became compulsory, it stopped being taught and all
education was received in Spanish. During the Franco dictatorship (1940-1975) its use was
restricted and the Spanish language was the only one used as an o¢ cial language and the only
language used in education. Once the dictatorship ended, Spain experienced a transition from
a centralized to a politically decentralized system. Regions acquired the status of autonomous
communities and were allowed to have their own regional parliaments. One of the most im-
portant laws approved by the new Catalan government was the "Catalan Law of Language
Normalization" (1983), whose main goal was to promote the use of the Catalan language.
In one of its most relevant parts, the new law allowed the educational system (previously
all in Spanish as an inheritance from the Franco period) to become bilingual. Although schools
had been able to teach the Catalan language as a subject since 1978, until 1983 it was not
7
recognized as the main language to be used in education. All students, irrespective of their
origin, were supposed to use both Catalan and Spanish at the end of their education as the
law made it clear that the Certicate of Basic Educational Attainment could not be obtained
without proving prociency in both languages. The law also stated that students should not be
allocated in di¤erent classes because of language di¤erences and Catalan had to be introduced
following the studentslearning process. The law referred to all education levels below university
education, including secondary, primary and pre-school education. However, Article 14 of the
law states that in preschool, at the beginning of their education, students should be able to
receive education in Spanish or in Catalan, according to their mother tongue.
Since the Catalan education system had been Spanish-based for such a long time, the tran-
sition to a bilingual system was designed to be smooth. Several subsequent decrees and orders
explain how the reform was to be introduced in the rst years. Students who were in primary
or secondary education during the academic year 1983/1984 have been a¤ected by the reform;
starting from that academic year at least one subject had to be taught in Catalan as required
by the order passed the 5th of August 1982 and, then, the presence of Catalan in schools had
to be progressively enhanced in subsequent years as clearly stated by Articles 8 and 9 of Decree
362/1983. For secondary education, the increased presence of the Catalan language in each
school had to occur in accordance with the studentsprior knowledge of Catalan, in order to
minimize its e¤ects on the normal learning process.
Like most of the reforms involving changes in the languages of instruction, the introduction
of bilingualism in Catalan schools was associated with other adjustments in the educational
system. A direct implication of the linguistic policy is the translation of old textbooks and
teaching materials and the adoption of new ones written in the Catalan language. Several
orders related to the 1983 law also claried the contents of the courses that had to be taught
in schools: Catalan as well as Spanish culture, history and geography had to be taught in
schools at all educational levels. However, as discussed by Siguan (1991), the reform did not
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involve a substantial replacement of the teaching corps. Hundreds of teachers beneted from
training schemes in the Catalan language and, although tests of knowledge of Catalan were
also applied in the recruitment of new teachers, those who failed such a test had to commit
to becoming procient in the Catalan language within a few years. Only since 1989 have tests
been compulsory and eliminatory.5 As already mentioned in the Introduction, although the
identication strategy adopted throughout the paper does not allow us to disentangle the pure
e¤ect of the introduction of bilingualism from the standard additional features of most of the
policies that modify the language of instruction, such as changes in textbooks, course contents
and even teachers attitudes, our empirical exercise delivers a global evaluation of the 1983
reform of the Catalan educational system, which is broadly comparable with similar linguistic
reforms implemented in other educational systems (among others, the ones implemented in
Quebec (1977), Morocco (1983) and South Africa (1994)).
The Catalan Law of Normalization, however, involved other changes, as the goal of the
law was to increase the use of the Catalan language and make it an e¤ective communication
vehicle. In fact, it clearly established that citizens had the right to use Catalan and encouraged
its use by the media. These changes could represent a threat for our identication strategy
since individuals belonging to younger cohorts have been spending a longer part of their life
in an environment with a greater use of Catalan language. We try to address this issue by
including in the regression analysis a exible function of the cohort of birth and performing
several robustness checks that seem to disregard the possibility that the results presented are
driven by the inclusion of younger respondents that have been more exposed to Catalan culture
and history.
5Therefore our results are unlikely to capture the fact that new teachers with stronger Catalan feelings have
been hired because of the reform and have been transmitting their beliefs to students (see Saint-Paul 2010 for a
theoretical discussion of such a mechanism).
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2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
In our empirical analysis we use data provided by "Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas" on
political and social attitudes of residents in Catalonia. The survey was conducted in 2001.
To identify individualsnational attachment to Spain or Catalonia, we rely on the following
question: "With which of the following sentences do you identify with more? (1) I feel only
Spanish, (2) I feel more Spanish than Catalan, (3) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, (4) I feel more
Catalan than Spanish, (5) I feel only Catalan". From this survey question we derive the two
main variables we will be using as dependent variables in our empirical analysis: (i) Identity,
which is dened over the range 1-5 and takes the value 1 if the individual reports feeling only
Spanish, and 5 if she/he reports feeling only Catalan (ii) IdentityD, obtained by converting the
survey question into a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent feels only Catalan,
more Catalan than Spanish or as Spanish as Catalan and 0 otherwise.
Let us now discuss the variables we use to measure the degree of exposure to the reform and
therefore to Catalan instruction. We start by dening years of exposure to the reform as the
number of years of education received in Catalan language. Thus, years of exposure depends on
whether an individual was in primary or secondary education after the law was implemented in
1983, which depends on his/her year of birth and the number of years of education. Respondents
born in or after 1970 were at least partially a¤ected by the 1983 reform, while respondents
born between 1966 and 1969 received education in Catalan only if they attended secondary
education.6
As discussed in the background section, although the reform may have also a¤ected the
language of teaching during the preschool time, preschool in Catalonia is not compulsory and
parents can choose the language of education of their children; moreover, we do not have infor-
mation on the number of years of preschool attended in Catalonia. In one of the specications
6Note that the length of primary and secondary education in Spain is 8 and 4 years respectively and children
start school at the age of 6. We do not consider university education since the law we study did not a¤ect it.
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presented in the next section, however, we introduce a new measure of exposure, years of ex-
posure from preschool, that assumes that all the respondents attended 3 years of preschool in
Catalonia. This measure, therefore, takes into account the possibility that the identity of re-
spondents who were born after 1977 may have been a¤ected by the fact that they received part
or all their preschool education in Catalan language.
The number of years of schooling is, however, typically an individual choice (or a parental
one) and may have been a¤ected by the introduction of the educational reform. Respondents
with very intense Spanish feelings, for instance migrants from another region of Spain, might
have felt less comfortable about receiving education in Catalan and decided to drop out from
school as a consequence of the reform. Individuals with very intense Catalan feelings would also
be more likely to stay at school longer if the education was in Catalan. Thus, coe¢ cients of a
regression of identity on our measure of exposure would be biased upwards. In other words, the
length of exposure to Catalan education could have potentially been determined by the identity
of the respondent or by the strength of Catalan feelings of his/her parents (which in turn are
likely to be transmitted to their children).
In order to avoid biases related to the endogeneity of the length of exposure to the reform,
in the main specication we rely on a measure of exposure that is not the result of an individual
choice. To account for unobservables that could a¤ect both schooling and identity, we dene
years of compulsory exposure to the reform as the number of years of compulsory education
received in Catalan language. Until 1990 the length of compulsory education established by
law was 8 years, that is only primary education was compulsory and students could have left
school at the age of 14. In 1990, with the approval of the Law of General Ordering of the
Educational System (LOGSE), the rst two years of secondary education became compulsory
as well, so students could have left school at the age of 16. Years of compulsory exposure is a
variable that only depends on the year of birth of the respondent; each respondent belonging
to the same cohort will be subject to the same amount of exposure to compulsory education.
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Respondents from the 1970 cohort received 1 year of compulsory exposure, since only their last
year of primary (compulsory) education was a¤ected by the reform. In general, the length of
compulsory exposure to the reform corresponds to the number of years of primary education
received after the 1983 reform and therefore it is equal to 8 years for all the cohorts born in 1977
or afterwards.7 We include in our sample respondents belonging to any cohort of birth (that
is cohorts 1908-1983).8 Therefore the respondents who did not receive any year of compulsory
Catalan education are the ones who were born before 1970, the ones who received some years
of Catalan education (from 1 to 7) are the ones born between 1970 and 1976, the ones who
received all their primary (and compulsory) education in Catalonia are the ones born in or after
1977.
The econometric specication to be tested is then:
Identityic = + Y ears of Comp:Exp:c + xic + f(c) + "ic (1)
where the dependent variable Identityic is the identity measure of individual i, from cohort
c. Y ears of Comp:Exp:c is the number of years of compulsory exposure to teaching in Catalan
experienced by an individual belonging to cohort c, f(c) are fourth order polynomials of the
cohort of birth c to control for cohort trends and age e¤ects, and xic is a vector of control
variables, that include the gender of the respondent, his/her origin, the origin of his/her parents,
his/her province of residence and the size of his/her town of residence. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the cohort level to control for the fact that observations in a given cohort group
may be correlated.
Our identication strategy relies on the implicit assumption that there is no other variable
that a¤ects how certain cohort groups feel about the Catalan identity issue. In the robustness
7The only notable exception is represented by the respondents born in 1983. They were subject to 10 years
of compulsory education, which were all experienced after the reform. So individuals from the 1983 cohort were
subject to 10 years of compulsory exposure.
8Since the survey includes information on when respondents arrived in Catalonia, we decided to exclude from
the sample only migrants who did not receive any education inside Catalonia, as they would not be comparable
to the rest (373 observations).
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section of the paper, we discuss the fact that the composition of the sample might not be
exogenous to the reform and we rule out the possibility that our estimates are simply driven
by cohort trends in Catalan feelings or by the impact on identity of the end of the Franco
dictatorship.
Table 1 provides the full set of descriptive statistics for the main variables used; details on
the construction of each variable can be found in the data appendix. Figures 1 and 2 then
provide preliminary evidence on the relationship between exposure to the reform and strength
of Catalan identity. We start by realizing that for a set of cohorts (1969-1977) compulsory
exposure to Catalan education increased linearly from 0 to 8 years. Older cohorts were not
a¤ected at all, while younger cohorts were fully a¤ected by the 1983 reform (they all received
all their compulsory education in Catalan language). We then expect the strength of Catalan
identity to be increasing (not necessarily linearly) among cohorts 1969-1977, but not among
younger/older cohorts. We provide graphical evidence that supports this conjecture. Figure 1
plots the average of the variable IdentityD by cohort for the sample of respondents born between
1960 and 1983; then we separate 3 groups, i.e. cohorts not a¤ected by compulsory exposure,
cohorts fully a¤ected and cohorts 1969-1977, and, for each of the 3 groups, we plot a non-linear
function, estimated using locally weighted least squares (LOWESS) to t the curve.
TABLE 1 HERE
As it is possible to notice, while there seems to be a negative trend when considering co-
horts fully a¤ected or not a¤ected by the reform (the younger respondents are, the weaker their
Catalan feelings), this trend is stopped and partially reversed by the introduction of Catalan
education. Catalan identity is a positive and concave function of the number of years of treat-
ment; the e¤ect of instruction in Catalan language becomes smaller once the respondent has
already received few years of instruction in Catalan language.
Quite interestingly the reform seems to have already an impact on cohorts 1966-1969. This
is because, as pointed earlier in the paper, respondents within those cohorts got their secondary
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(and not compulsory) education under Catalan instruction. We then focus on the set of cohorts
1965-1977 (for this set of cohorts potential exposure during compulsory and non-compulsory
education to Catalan education increased linearly from 0 to 12 years) and perform a similar





We now turn to the empirical evidence. Table 2 shows estimates of equation (1) using years of
compulsory exposure as the measure of exposure to the reform and controlling for the quartic
order polynomial of the cohort of birth. In column 1 we report results obtained using Identity
as the dependent variable, in column 2 using IdentityD. We then introduce the set of control
variables discussed in the previous section: province of residence dummies, controls for size
of town of residence, gender, family and individual origin. We classied respondents into 4
categories: 1) individuals who were not born in Catalonia 2) individuals who were born in
Catalonia but whose parents were not 3) individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only
one parent born in Catalonia 4) individuals who were born in Catalonia and whose parents
were both born in Catalonia. Columns 3-4 report results for both the dependent variables
using a specication that includes both the full set of control variables and a fourth order
polynomial of the cohort of birth. Column 4 represents our baseline specication. We choose
IdentityD as dependent variable in the baseline specication because its binomial nature makes
the interpretation of the coe¢ cients of interest easier. Table 2 o¤ers quite a uniform picture.
Exposure to Catalan instruction indeed fostered the intensity of Catalan identity. Estimates
from column 4 suggest that one year of exposure to the reform increased the probability of feeling
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only Catalan, more Catalan than Spanish or as Catalan as Spanish by more than 2 percentage
points, that is about 7% of one standard deviation. The intensity of Catalan identity is, as is
predictable, correlated with the origin of the interviewed and the origin of his/her parents as
well. We nd that Catalan identity is strongest among respondents who were born in Catalonia
and whose parents were both born in Catalonia, and it is weakest among respondents who were
not born in Catalonia.
TABLE 2 HERE
In Table 3 we provide some specication checks. We rst run the baseline specication
controlling for di¤erent functions of the birth cohort, in column 1 we use a third order polynomial
and in column 2 a fth order one. Results are similar to those obtained before; the coe¢ cient
when we control for a third order polynomial is, however, slightly smaller. Columns 3-5 present
results obtained using our baseline specication but considering three di¤erent measures of
exposure to Catalan teaching. First, in column 3 we use the variable years of exposure, that,
as discussed in the previous section, could su¤er from possible endogeneity problems; the
coe¢ cient obtained is, however, very similar to our baseline coe¢ cient. Second, in column 4
we take into account the possibility that the reform may also have a¤ected individual identity
during preschool by using the measure years of exposure from preschool, which assumes that
all individuals have attended 3 years of preschool. The estimated coe¢ cient is very similar to
the baseline coe¢ cient. Finally, in column 5 we consider a binomial measure of treatment, the
compulsory exposure dummy, which is a variable equal to 1 if the respondent has been subject to
at least one year of compulsory education in Catalan language, and zero otherwise. Respondents
exposed to the reform are 7.5 percentage points more likely to feel only Catalan, more Catalan
than Spanish or as Catalan as Spanish.
The e¤ect of the introduction of bilingual education in Catalan schools on individual identity
can be analyzed using Akerlof and Kranton (2000) as a reference framework. In their framework
the utility of an individual depends on his/her identity and individuals can choose to belong
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to certain groups and therefore adopt the corresponding social identity and follow the related
behavioral prescriptions. In this setting there are two alternative mechanisms through which
education can a¤ect individual identity. First, the reform may have reduced the level of e¤ort
that individuals have to spend in order to behave accordingly to the prescriptions of the Catalan
group (i.e. have an adequate command of the Catalan language), therefore making more attrac-
tive the identication with such group. Alternatively, the reform may have increased the utility
associated to identication with the Catalan group, for instance by changing the perception
among students of the social status assigned to such group.9 Students learn to associate Cata-
lan language with schooling, which is likely to be perceived as the most important institution
by children at that age.
TABLE 3 HERE
4 Robustness
In this section, we perform several robustness checks to conrm the validity of the identication
strategy used. We rst investigate whether our estimates are capturing the existence of cohort
trends in Catalan feelings or the e¤ect of the end of the dictatorship, and then we run some
robustness checks to account for the fact that the reform could have a¤ected migration ows
(and then the composition of our sample).
Di¤erent cohorts might have been raised by parents with di¤erent values and preferences
(the younger parents being more pro-Catalan), therefore our estimates could be the artifact
of cohort specic trends in Catalan feelings. To rule out this possibility we perform several
falsication exercises: we consider only the sample of respondents who were not a¤ected by
Catalan instruction either in compulsory or in secondary education, that is we consider only
individuals who were born before 1966, and we assign a pseudo treatment to the youngest
9Similarly, using the Benabou and Tirole (2011) framework, we can interpret the increase in the strength of
Catalan identication as a consequence of the rise in the perceived salience of the ethnic cleavage due to the
exposure to Catalan language in schools.
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cohorts as if the reform had been implemented in a year X rather than in 1983, where the year
X is a generic year between 1939 and 1978. In this way we perform a battery of 40 falsication
tests; the coe¢ cients of the pseudotreatment of each of the 40 tests are displayed in Table 4. It
is worth noting that when positive, the coe¢ cients of the pseudo treatment variable are never
signicant and always smaller in size than the coe¢ cient of our variable of interest as reported
in our baseline specication in Column 4 of Table 2. Only one of the 40 coe¢ cients is negative
and signicant at the 10% level, the one obtained when assuming the reform was implemented
in 1976; the size of that coe¢ cient is not negligible, but this is very likely to be due to the very
small number of observations a¤ected by the pseudo treatment (in that case the only cohorts
considered as treated are 1963-1965).10
TABLE 4 HERE
We then test whether our results are driven by the fact that respondents exposed to Catalan
education were also a¤ected by the end of the Franco regime in 1975. The previous exercise
may also be considered the rst robustness check in this direction as it seems to disregard the
possibility that the reform is driven by events that took place between 1975 and 1978. We
conduct, however, two further robustness checks. First we add as a control in the baseline
specication the total number of years exposed to democracy (we consider 1975 as the rst year
of democracy in Spain) before age 18. Results are reported in Column 1 of Table 5. Reassuringly,
the coe¢ cient of our exposure variable remains positive and signicant. Results do not change
if instead we consider as relevant years either 1978, when the reform of the constitution took
place, or 1981, when a coup detat was attempted (see Columns 2 and 3). As a further exercise,
in Column 4 we restrict our sample to respondents who started their education after the end
10We also perform another test in which we use only cohorts who received the same amount of treatment (8
years) and that therefore were born in 1977 or after. Within this very small sample, younger cohorts may have
received a di¤erent level of exposure to Catalan culture, history, or language outside of school than older cohorts.
In order to check whether this is actually what we are capturing in our results we assign a pseudotreatment to
the youngest cohorts as if the reform had been implemented in a year X>1983 rather than in 1983 (in this set of
exercises given the extremely limited number of cohorts we use linear cohort trends). We never nd any evidence
that these pseudo-reforms have a positive e¤ect on the identity of the respondents. Results are available upon
request.
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of the Franco´s regime, that is we restrict the sample to cohorts born in 1970 or later. Results
are robust to this additional check.
The appearance of Catalan media could also have a¤ected our results; since the mid-1980s,
a TV channel (TV3) has broadcast in the Catalan language and the di¤usion of the daily press
in Catalan has increased considerably. Younger cohorts therefore have been, in relative terms,
more exposed to Catalan-language media. We cannot observe the lifetime exposure to Catalan-
language media of respondents, but we do have information on their current behavior, which
will most likely be correlated to past behavior. We know whether at the time of the survey
the respondent watches Catalan TV, Spanish TV or both. Column 3 of Table 5 shows results
when we control for current exposure to Catalan language TV: the coe¢ cient of interest is still
positive and signicant (and also very similar in size).11 It must be acknowledged, however,
that controlling for current consumption of Catalan media is very problematic since, clearly, this
variable can be a¤ected by the treatment itself as the 1983 reform is likely to have stimulated
prociency in the Catalan language.
TABLE 5 HERE
The reform might have a¤ected the composition of the Catalan population, as it could have
changed migration patterns into and out of Catalonia. Schooling in Catalan could have implied
an additional cost of migration to Catalonia for Spanish speakers. This additional migration
cost could have been higher for potential migrants with very intense Spanish sentiments who,
as a result, could have decided not to migrate towards Catalonia. Similarly, people with very
intense Spanish sentiments could have decided to leave Catalonia after the reform. If this is the
case, our results could be capturing a change in the composition of Catalan society rather than
the e¤ect of the reform.
As a rst step, we rule out the possibility that the results we nd are related to a change
11As a second exercise, we check whether the e¤ect of the 1983 reform varies with the current exposure to
Catalan language media. We introduce interactions between our measure of compulsory exposure to the language
reform and a dummy that is equal to 1 if the respondent either watches Catalan TV or both Catalan and Spanish,
and 0 otherwise. We nd that the e¤ect of the reform is homogenous and independent of current exposure to
Catalan language TV. Results are available from the authors on request.
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in the pattern of migration inows in Catalonia. We restrict the sample to individuals whose
parents were already in Catalonia when the reform was implemented. For these individuals,
their parentsdecision to migrate to Catalonia is less likely to be a¤ected by the educational
reform. Column 6 of Table 5 shows that the results are robust to this check.12 However, it can
still be the case that patterns of migration outows, although very small in size, are a¤ected by
the reform and, at the same time, contribute to our results. Unfortunately, the survey we have
does not allow for any checks that could help us in this direction. We then use other data sources
to exclude the possibility that the size and the composition of migration outows (inows) have
been a¤ected by the 1983 reform of the educational system.
We then use "Residential Variation Data" from the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística).
This is the only source of annual aggregate migration ows that goes back earlier than 1987,
but allows us to provide some evidence that the size of migration outows (inows) were not
a¤ected by the introduction of bilingualism. We consider the following specication,
Yi;t = Cati;t + Afteri;t + Cati;t Afteri;t + "it
where Yi;t are the size of outows (inows) in per capita terms of region i in year t (from 1978
to 1987), Cati;t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation refers to Catalan migration
outows or inows and Afteri;t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation refers to years
from 1983 onwards (after the reform was implemented). In the rst specication, we consider
all the Spanish regions; in the second one, only Catalonia and the other 5 richest regions;13 the
coe¢ cient of the interaction term (Table 6) is always very close to zero and not signicant.14
This suggests that the size of per-capita migration ows in Catalonia were not a¤ected by the
1983 law.
12Results (available on request) do not change if we restrict the sample even further to control for the possibility
that parents somehow anticipated the 1983 reform and then took the migration decision before 1983.
13Catalonia, The Basque Country, The Balearic Islands, Madrid, Navarra, and Valencia. These are the richest
regions according to GDP per capita measures in 2001 (provided by INE).
14Results do not change if we use the logarithm as the dependent variable.
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As a further robustness check, we consider individual data from the 2001 Spanish Census.
For each individual interviewed we know the current province of residence, the previous province
of residence (if any) and the year in which they moved (if they moved) from one province
to the other. Results in Table 7 show the similarity of several characteristics of individuals
who moved out of (into) Catalonia in 1982 (the rst year before the reform) and those who
moved out of (into) Catalonia in 1984 (the rst year after the reform). We cannot reject the
hypotheses of equality in age of migration, years of education, province of birth and other
parental characteristics. This suggests that the composition of migration ows (both inows




In this section we discuss how the introduction of bilingual education might have repercus-
sions on economic outcomes by a¤ecting the political preferences and attitudes towards the
organization of the State and the level of integration of minorities
Our ndings can potentially be of general interest and not only related to the Catalan society.
The number of languages spoken in the world is estimated to be between 6000 and 7000 and there
are more than 20 States with more than one o¢ cial language.15 Several countries, in addition
to the o¢ cial language, recognize other national languages, occasionally also compulsory in
education, and in many others, a variety of languages are widely used without having the legal
authority of an o¢ cial language.16 Multilingual societies have often adopted more than one
language of instruction. Canada and India have extensive experience in multilingual education;
for four decades in India, there were at least three languages of instruction, the o¢ cial language
15The choice of one language over another, however, has often been often an important and divisive issue. In
1956, in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese was made the o¢ cial language, provoking a strong reaction by the Tamil minority,
and until 1994, in Turkey the use of the Kurdish language in public was prohibited by law.
16See UNESCO (2003) and the UN report (2004) for a discussion of the topic.
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of each Indian state plus English and Hindi. In Latin America, indigenous groups receive
instruction in their own language and in the o¢ cial language of the country, while in most
Sub-Saharan African countries, children are educated in their local languages during the very
rst grades and in the colonial language (French, English or Portuguese) during the later stages
of their education. Bilingual education has been a feature of schooling throughout the history
of the United States. In 1968 the Bilingual Education Act, a provision of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, authorized funds for programs for students who spoke languages
other than English. Later on, the 1974 Supreme Court decision maintained that school programs
exclusively in English denied equal access to education to nonnative students and determined
that districts with such students had a responsibility to help them overcome their language
disadvantage.
5.1 Integration of Minorities
Bilingual education can a¤ect the integration of ethnic minorities. The large migration inows
experienced by Western countries in the last few decades and several episodes of social unrest
involving ethnic minorities, rst and second generation immigrants (ethnic riots occurred in US
in 1992, UK in 2001 and, more recently in France in 2005), placed the issue of the cultural and
economic assimilation of immigrants at the center of the political debate.
Recent economic literature investigated whether the cultural integration of immigrants, and
more in general, members of ethnic minorities, is conducive to better performance in education
and in the labor market. As formalized by Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), part of the gap in
academic achievements between blacks and whites in the United States may be explained by
the adoption of "oppositional" identities by students belonging to the black minority. Learning
standard English and performing well at school may be regarded as "acting white" and adopting
a "white" identity and therefore punished by the members of the black community. Evidence
in this sense is provided by Fryer and Torelli (2010). Algan et al. (2010) found that in France,
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Germany and UK the educational gap between natives and immigrants is much smaller in the
second as compared to the rst generation. This nding may be partially explained by the higher
level of integration of second generation immigrants. Mason (2004) documents that Hispanic
American with a non-Hispanic white racial identity tend to work and earn more and similar
ndings are reported by Nekby and Rodin (2010) using Swedish data. In the UK a strong ethnic
identity is associated with an employment penalty according to results obtained by Battu and
Zenou (2010), while in Germany we have a a less clear picture: Constant et al. (2006) and
Zimmermann et al. (2007) found that the probability of being employed is signicantly lower
for immigrants that are separated and marginalized, while Casey and Dustmann (2010) do not
report any pronounced e¤ect of ethnic identity on labor market outcomes. A broader view
is proposed by Bisin et al. (2011) who, using a cross country framework, provide suggestive
evidence that a strong ethnic identity is associated with a lower probability of being employed
among non-EU immigrants in Europe.
Therefore we now try to understand whether the reform of the Catalan education system
has had an impact on the minorities living in the Catalan region. We dene as a minority group
all respondents of non-Catalan origin or with parents who are not of Catalan origin (rst and
second generation immigrants). We then construct 2 dummy variables, creating two groups.
The rst group includes individuals not born in Catalonia and individuals born in Catalonia
with both parents who were not born in Catalonia. The second group includes individuals born
in Catalonia for whom at least one of the parents was born in Catalonia. We then interact these
two dummy variables with our exposure variable. Results in column 1 of Table 8 show that
the reform had a positive impact also on the Catalan identity of respondents belonging to the
minority group as dened previously. Nation-building policies (such as the implementation of a
unique national language in schools and across the entire territory of a State) seem to promote
the growth of a common national feeling.
The 1983 reform of the Catalan education system can, however, also be interpreted as an
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example of a multicultural policy within Spain, where individuals living in Catalonia are the
relevant minority. Catalan residents are indeed listed as an ethnic minority in many of the most
important datasets that list the ethnic groups within each country (such as for instance the
datasets provided by Fearon (2003) and Alesina et al.(2003)). According to such interpretation,
we can conclude that multicultural policies instead tend to favor the development of regional
identities.
5.2 Political Preferences
The Catalan educational reform might also have a¤ected economic outcomes by changing the
political preferences of Catalan residents and therefore inuencing the selection of politicians
and the policies implemented by them. Indeed, Banerjee and Pande (2007) found evidence
that stronger voter ethnicization, dened as a greater preference by a voter for the party repre-
senting his/her ethnic group, is associated with lower quality and more corrupt politicians. A
governance outcome very widespread in severely divided societies (for instance Nigeria, Uganda
and Burundi) is patronage, the system of granting benets to members of a particular ethnic
group while penalizing other ethnic groups. Alesina et al. (1999) and (2000) provide evidence
that politicians in more fragmented US cities tend to lower the provision of public goods and
increase targeted benets such as public employment.
The CIS 2001 survey includes a question in which individuals are asked who they voted for
in the 1999 elections for the Catalan Parliament. This feature of the data allows us to compare
the voting behavior of individuals a¤ected by the reform with the voting behavior of individuals
not a¤ected and then to perform a direct test on whether the reform increased the salience of
the ethnic issue. In Catalonia, at the time of the survey there were mainly ve political parties:
Convergència i Unió (CIU), the party that was in power from 1980 to 2003, Partit dels Socialistes
de Catalunya (PSC), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), Partido Popular (PP), and
Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV). We consider parties to be Catalan if their manifestos
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include the approval of a law that would give Catalonia the right to self-determination. These
parties are CIU, ERC and ICV. Column 2 of Table 8 reports estimates for Equation (1), using
as a dependent variable a dummy equal to one if the respondent voted for a Catalan regionalist
party in the 1999 regional election. We restrict the sample to respondents who declared having
voted during such elections. Results suggest that those who were more exposed to Catalan
instruction tend to be signicantly more likely to vote for Catalan parties; in fact, an extra
year of compulsory education in Catalan increases the likelihood that the respondent declared
that he/she voted for a Catalan party by 4 percentage points, which corresponds to 6% of the
average.
We then use two other questions of the survey in which respondents are asked about their
opinion on how the Spanish state should be organized and how strong the degree of independence
of the Catalan region should be. In the rst question respondents are asked whether they would
like the Spanish State to be more centralized than it is now, as centralized as now, less centralized
than now or whether Spanish regions should even have the right to claim independence. We
generate a dummy that is equal to 1 if the respondent chooses the more extreme option, the
one that allows regions to be independent States, zero otherwise. Similarly in the second
question respondents are asked whether (i) the region of Catalonia should be part of a more
centralized State, (ii) should have the same powers that it has now (iii) should increase its
competencies (iv) should be able to become an independent State. Again, we create a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the respondent selects the fourth alternative. Results are in
column 3 and 4 of Table 8 and show that those a¤ected by an additional year of instruction in
Catalan during compulsory education are 2 percentage points more likely to say that Spanish
regions, and Catalonia in particular, should have the right to ask for independence. The rise
in separatist attitudes might a¤ect economic outcomes as they increase the probability of an
open conict as extensively discussed by Horowitz (1985). Recent literature discusses the large
e¤ects of conicts on economic outcomes (Besley and Muller (2011) and Eckstein and Tsiddon
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(2004)); Abadie and (2003) quantify the economic penalties connected to the Basque conict
in terms of 10% of the Basque region GDP. Moreover, in Catalonia there has always been the
widespread perception that, being among the richest regions of Spain, the amount of taxes paid
to the central government is considerably higher than the amount of resources and services
received from it. In fact, in a recent survey conducted by the Catalan government, 43% of the
respondents were in favor of a referendum for independence and, among those who would vote
yes to such referendum, 36.4% argued that they would do so to allow Catalonia to manage
its own economic resources. The rise in local identity and separatist attitudes caused by the
reform of the Catalan education system may have increased the pressure towards the central
government to release scal powers by increasing the responsibilities of the Catalan government
in terms of tax collection and public good provision (indeed reforms that increased the level of
scal decentralization were approved in Spain in 1997 and 2001).
TABLE 8 HERE
6 Conclusions
Much has been said about the possibility that education can a¤ect individual identity and
preferences. However, to date, not many studies have been conducted on this matter. We have
considered the 1983 educational reform, through which the Catalan education system became
bilingual and Catalan as well as Spanish was taught in schools, and we have found a positive
and large e¤ect of this policy on Catalan identity. We then interpret the reform as an example
of nation-building policy within Catalonia and try to build a bridge with the current literature
on the integration of rst and second generation immigrants. We nd that the e¤ect of the
reform extends to respondents whose parents were not born in Catalonia and conclude that
nation-building policies encourage the growth of a shared national sentiment among minorities.
The survey used for Catalonia further allows us to show that the 1983 reform increased voting
for Catalan parties and separatist attitudes. The shift in identity may be one of the channels
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through which this takes place.
Nowadays, most countries in the world could be classied as multilingual. However, not all of
them have multilingual educational systems. The UNESCO report "Education in a Multilingual
World" explains that the choice of language of education constitutes an important challenge in
the development of educational policies. In addition, mother tongue instruction is considered
important for the quality of the education provided. Language can be regarded not only as a
communication tool but also as an attribute of empowerment and cultural identity. Research of
this sort along with the study of the e¤ects of such reforms on political and economic outcomes
can be highly relevant in ethnically divided societies where linguistic policies can be seen as
mechanisms of conict reduction. We have considered the 1983 educational reform, through
which the Catalan education system became bilingual and Catalan as well as Spanish was taught
in schools, and we have found a positive and large e¤ect of this policy on Catalan identity. We
need to stress, however, that our work does not fully separate the e¤ects of the introduction of
bilingualism from the other contemporaneous changes in the Catalan educational system, such
as the revision of course contents and textbooks.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data Appendix-Denition of the variables
-Identity: ordered variable which assumes the following values: (1) if the respondent answered
"I feel only Spanish"; (2) if the respondent answered "I feel more Spanish than Catalan"; (3) if
the respondent answered "I feel as Spanish as Catalan"; (4) if the respondent answered "I feel
more Catalan than Spanish" and (5) if the respondent answered "I feel only Catalan". Source:
CIS
-IdentityD: Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent answered "I feel as Spanish
as Catalan", "I feel more Catalan than Spanish" or "I feel only Catalan", 0 otherwise. Source:
CIS
-Catalan origin, Catalan family: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered that he was
born in Catalonia and both his parents were born in Catalonia. Source: CIS
-Catalan origin, mixed family: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered that he was
born in Catalonia and only one of his parents were born in Catalonia. Source: CIS
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-Catalan origin, non-Catalan family: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered that he
was born in Catalonia and neither of his parents were born in Catalonia. Source: CIS
-Non-Catalan origin: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered that he was not born
in Catalonia. Source: CIS
-Female: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is female. Source: CIS
-Voting: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent declares to have voted in the 1999 regional
election. Source: CIS
-Catalan Voting (IC+ERC+CIU): dummy equal to 1 if the respondent declares to have
voted for a Catalanist party in the 1999 regional election. We consider IC, ERC and CIU to be
Catalanist parties. Source: CIS
-Catalan TV: : dummy equal to 1 if the individual currently watches Catalan TV or both
Catalan and Spanish TV, 0 otherwise. Source: CIS
-Outows: annual per capita outows. Source: Residential Variation Data, INE.
-Inows: annual per capita inows. Source: Residential Variation Data, INE.
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Fig. 1 : Identity by cohort
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Note: Each dot represents the average of Identity(D) by cohort. The lines are lowess fits for 3 groups of
cohorts: 1959-1969, 1969-1977 and 1977-1983.
Note: Each dot represents the average of Identity(D) by cohort. The lines are lowess fits for 3 groups of
cohorts: 1959-1965, 1965-1977 and 1977-1983.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Identity 2309 3.5725 1.1296
IdentityD 2309 0.8727 0.3334
Catalan Voting 1888 0.6112 0.4876
Independence Preferences (1) 2263 0.2342 0.4236
Independence Preferences (2) 2282 0.2441 0.4296
Years of exposure to the reform 2292 2.5537 4.1753
Years of exposure during compulsory education 2309 1.7540 3.1291
Compulsory Exposure Dummy 2309 0.2811 0.4496
Years of exposure to the reform + preschool 2292 2.8538 4.7848
Years of exposure to democracy before 18 2309 6.4036 7.4054
Years of exposure to constitution (1978) before 18 2309 5.3274 6.9142
Years of exposure after coup d'etat (1981) before 18 2309 4.2369 6.1885
Watches TV in Catalan 2294 0.8923 0.3100
Age 2309 44.9861 18.0871
Female 2309 0.4829 0.4998
Province: Barcelona 2309 0.4153 0.4929
Province: Girona 2309 0.1958 0.3969
Province: Lleida 2309 0.2040 0.4030
Province: Tarragona 2309 0.1849 0.3883
Not born in Catalonia 2309 0.1589 0.3657
Born in Catalonia with parents born outside Catalonia 2309 0.1793 0.3837
Born in Catalonia with one parent born in Catalonia 2309 0.1308 0.3372
Born in Catalonia with both parents born in Catalonia 2309 0.5310 0.4991
Less than 2000 inhabitants 2309 0.1455 0.3527
Between 2001 and 10000 inhabitants 2309 0.2096 0.4071
Between 10001 and 50000 inhabitants 2309 0.2252 0.4178
Between 50001 and 100000 inhabitants 2309 0.1065 0.3086
Between 100001 and 40000 inhabitants 2309 0.1763 0.3811
More than 1000000 inhabitants 2309 0.1369 0.3438
Table 2: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Identity IdentityD Identity IdentityD
Years of exposure during compulsory education 0.0745*** 0.0279*** 0.0580** 0.0237***
(0.0225) (0.00680) (0.0245) (0.00706)
Born in Catalonia with parents born outside Catalonia 0.665*** 0.301***
(0.0890) (0.0337)
Born in Catalonia with one parent born in Catalonia 1.138*** 0.350***
(0.0751) (0.0309)
Born in Catalonia with both parents born in Catalonia 1.503*** 0.403***
(0.0716) (0.0283)
Individual Controls x x
Polynomial 4th 4th 4th 4th
Observations 2309 2309 2309 2309
R-squared 0.011 0.017 0.318 0.222
Table 3: Specification Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: IdentityD
Years of exposure during compulsory education 0.0156* 0.0270***
(0.00818) (0.00809)
Years of exposure to the reform 0.0226***
(0.00545)
Years of exposure to the reform+preschool 0.0254***
(0.00650)
Compulsory Exposure Dummy 0.0768**
(0.0332)
Individual Controls x x x x x
Polynomial 3th 5th 4th 4th 4th
Observations 2309 2309 2292 2292 2309
R-squared 0.218 0.223 0.229 0.230 0.221
Note: In Columns 1 and 3 Identity is the dependent variable. Identity is a variable that takes values between 1 and 5, 1 if the
respondent answers he/she feels Only Spanish, 2 if he/she answers he/she feels More Spanish than Catalan, 3 he/she answers he/she
feels As Spanish as Catalan, 4 he/she answers he/she feels More Catalan than Spanish and 5 he/she answers he/she feels Only
Catalan. In Columns 2 and 4 IdentityD is the dependent variale. IdentityD is a dummy variable equal to one if Identity is equal to 3,4
or 5. Years of exposure during compulsory education is the number of years of compulsory education after 1983. Specifications 3 and
4 include dummy variables to control for gender, the province of residence and the size of town of residence, the origin of the
respondent and the origin of the respondent´s parents. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the
cohort level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Note: Years of exposure during compulsory education is the number of years of compulsory education after 1983. Years of exposure to the reform is
the number of years of education (compulsory and post compulsory) after 1983. Years of exposure to the reform+preschool takes into account that
individuals in preschool after 1983 could have been affected by 3 additional years of education in Catalan. Years of exposure to the Reform Dummy
is a dummy equal to one if the individual has received at least one year of education in Catalan during compulsory education. All specifications
include dummy variables to control for gender, the province of residence and the size of town of residence, the origin of the respondent and the origin
of the respondent´s parents. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the cohort level. * Significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 4: Falsification Exercises: Reform in Different Years
Coefficients: Years of exposure During Compulsory Education
Dependent variable: Identity Dummy
Year coeff se Year coeff se
Placebo reform Placebo reform
1939 0.00299 (0.00899) 1959 0.00997 (0.0106)
1940 -0.00295 (0.00923) 1960 0.00973 (0.00828)
1941 -0.00540 (0.00924) 1961 0.00857 (0.00782)
1942 -0.00463 (0.00935) 1962 0.00343 (0.00803)
1943 -0.00569 (0.00854) 1963 -0.000438 (0.00881)
1944 -0.00745 (0.00869) 1964 -0.00135 (0.00988)
1945 -0.0106 (0.00749) 1965 -0.00108 (0.0113)
1946 -0.0110 (0.00746) 1966 0.00141 (0.0101)
1947 -0.0102 (0.00804) 1967 0.00473 (0.00989)
1948 -0.00824 (0.00872) 1968 0.00746 (0.0122)
1949 -0.00756 (0.00872) 1969 0.00203 (0.0173)
1950 -0.00952 (0.00785) 1970 0.0113 (0.0194)
1951 -0.00838 (0.00705) 1971 0.0191 (0.0238)
1952 -0.00765 (0.00667) 1972 0.0114 (0.0245)
1953 -0.00506 (0.00704) 1973 -0.00905 (0.0225)
1954 -0.000723 (0.00795) 1974 -0.0153 (0.0183)
1955 0.00375 (0.00917) 1975 -0.0259 (0.0180)
1956 0.00731 (0.0111) 1976 -0.0416* (0.0228)
1957 0.0116 (0.0129) 1977 -0.0314 (0.0413)
1958 0.0122 (0.0120) 1978  -0.0625 (0.0435)
Table 5: Robustness
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable: IdentityD
Years exposure during compulsory edu 0.0262*** 0.0273*** 0.0235*** 0.0403*** 0.0235*** 0.0206**
(0.00766) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0096) (0.00700) (0.00816)
Years of exposure to democracy (1975) before 18 -0.00774
(0.00591)
Years of exposure to constitution (1978) before 18 -0.0058
(0.0061)
Years of exposure after coup d'etat (1981) before 18 0.0004
(0.0091)
Watches TV in Catalan 0.137***
(0.0342)
Individual Controls x x x x x x
Polynomial 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th
Sample born in 1970 restricted
or later arrival
Observations 2309 2309 2309 649 2294 2276
R-squared 0.223 0.2226 0.2223 0.2375 0.239 0.200
Note: IdentityD is a dummy variable equal to one if Identity is equal to 3,4 or 5. Years of exposure
during compulsory education is the number of years of compulsory education after the reform year.
Specifications include dummy variables to control for gender, the province of residence and the size of
town of residence, the origin of the respondent and the origin of the respondent´s parents. We consider
only the sample of respondents who were not affected by Catalan instruction either in compulsory or
in secondary education, that is we consider only individuals who were born before 1966, and we
assign a pseudo treatment to the youngest cohorts as if the reform had been implemented in a year X
rather than in 1983, where the year X is a generic year between 1939 and 1978. For each possible
placebo reform we perform our standard regression analysis and report the coefficient of the variable
"years of exposure during compulsory education" in the table. Robust standard errors are reported
between parentheses and are clustered at the cohort level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%.
Note: In the specifications in columns 1, 2 and 3 we control for the number of years of exposure to democracy (that is years of exposure after 1975) before the age of 18,
the number of years of exposure after 1978 and before 18, and the number of years of exposure after 1981 and before 18, respectively. In column 4 we restrict the
sample to those who started education after democracy in 1975. In column 5 we include a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual watches TV in Catalan. In
column 6 we restrict the sample to individuals who were already in Catalonia when the reform was implemented. All specifications include dummy variables to control
for gender, the province of residence and the size of town of residence, the origin of the respondent and the origin of the respondent´s parents. Robust standard errors are
reported between parentheses and are clustered at the cohort level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 6: Other robustness checks: Migration.
Dependent variable: Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catalonia -0.135 -0.179* -0.029 -0.040
(0.089) (0.096) (0.070) (0.067)
After1983 0.040 -0.002 0.034 0.051
(0.031) (0.055) (0.024) (0.039)
Catalonia x After1983 -0.106 -0.041 -0.032 -0.049
(0.126) (0.024) (0.099) (0.095)
SAMPLE all Spain 5 richest all Spain 5 richest 
No. obs. 170 60 170 60
Rsq 0.061 0.15 0.017 0.073
Table 7: Other robustness checks: Migration (II).
1982 1984 difference
mean sd mean sd diff sd of diff
Born in Catalonia 0.429 0.018 0.415 0.022 0.015 0.029
Age migrated 23.801 0.573 23.723 0.705 0.074 0.909
Years of Education 8.149 0.142 8.144 0.173 0.005 0.225
Years of Education-mother 6.164 0.262 6.556 0.323 -0.392 0.419
Years of Education-father 7.259 0.305 7.252 0.385 0.007 0.491
Male 0.497 0.018 0.478 0.022 0.019 0.029
Mother born in Catalonia 0.068 0.017 0.096 0.025 -0.028 0.029
Father born in Catalonia 0.069 0.018 0.042 0.018 0.027 0.027
1982 1984 difference
mean sd mean sd diff sd of diff
Born in Catalonia 0.168 0.017 0.205 0.018 -0.038 0.025
Age migrated 24.573 0.563 23.923 0.6171 0.6501 0.835
Years of Education 7.904 0.175 8.193 0.176 -0.289 0.248
Years of Education-mother 6.603 0.533 6.246 0.388 0.357 0.661
Years of Education-father 7.189 0.593 7.929 0.456 -0.739 0.742
Male 0.455 0.022 0.427 0.022 0.028 0.032
Mother born in Catalonia 0.254 0.055 0.279 0.041 -0.025 0.069




Note: In Columns 1 and 2, inflows is the dependent variable. In Column 1, the sample
consists of all the Spanish regions; in Column 2, it consists only of the 5 richest regions. In
Columns 3 and 4, outflows is the dependent variable. In Column 3, the sample consists of
all the Spanish regions; in Column 4, it consists only of the 5 richest regions. Robust
standard errors are reported between parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%.
Table 8: Additional Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IdentityD Catalan Independence Independence
Voting preferences (1) preferences(2)
Years of exposure comp edu * At least one parent born Catalonia 0.0255***
(0.00744)
Years of exposure comp edu * Individual or parents not born Catalonia 0.0213**
(0.00833)
Years of exposure during compulsory education 0.0406*** 0.0191** 0.0130
(0.0139) (0.00858) (0.00908)
Controls x x x x
Polynomial 4th 4th 4th 4th
Observations 2309 1888 2263 2282
R-squared 0.223 0.179 0.070 0.079
Note: In the specification in Column 1 IdentityD is the dependent variable. We generate 2 dummy variables, creating two groups. The first group includes
individuals born in Catalonia for which at least one of the parents was born in Catalonia. The second group includes individuals not born in Catalonia and
individuals born in Catalonia with both parents who were not born in Catalonia. We then interact these two dummy variables with years of exposure during
compulsory education. In the specification in Column 2 the dependent variable is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the respondent voted for a
Catalanist party during the regional elections. The sample is restricted to individuals who voted during those elections. In the specification in Column 3 the
dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent claims Spanish regions should be allowed to become independent States. In the
specification in Column 4 the dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent claims Catalonia should be allowed to become an
independent State. All specifications include dummy variables to control for gender, the province of residence and the size of town of residence, the origin
of the respondent and the origin of the respondent´s parents. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the cohort level. *
Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
